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Abstract
Research on security in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems is
dominated by reputation-based solutions. These solutions
propagate opinions about other peers in order to help iden-
tify the best set of peers to utilize. In this paper, we model
peers with utility functions and use those functions to exam-
ine the case in which an individual peer participates in an
unfamiliar and untrusted system, similar to one in which a
mobile peer can enter when moving into a new location. We
additionally introduce a novel security mechanism for P2P
systems called resource exploration in order to mitigate the
problems inherent in reputation-based systems and analyze
its effect on a 2-player game (between an attacker and the
benign peer).
1. Introduction
There have been many efforts dealing with economics in
P2P computing applications [1, 3, 4]; however, these meth-
ods primarily deal with forms of freeloading. Instead, this
paper will discuss the economics of end-to-end transactions
in a P2P system as perceived through the utility functions
of individual peers.
The goal of this research work is to analyze security
mechanisms in P2P systems in order to better compare
them, deﬁne new mechanisms to improve security, and bet-
terunderstandtheeconomiccauseofvulnerabilities. Oneof
the insufﬁciencies of reputation-based security in P2P sys-
tems is that it requires prior experience in order to make
decisions. As a result, a malicious peer must have previ-
ously attacked another peer in order to be recognized as
malicious. In a foreign system with no known trusted peers,
an entering peer is vulnerable to attack as it has no means
to determine the trustworthiness of any other peers in the
system. This fact can be exploited by an individual mali-
cious peer or by a set of collaborating peers. Furthermore,
a peer can initially behave benignly, be recognized as such,
and then act maliciously (either intentionally or due to be-
ing compromised). These attacks are described as risks that
require deeper investigation in [5].
In this paper, we have identiﬁed utility functions that de-
ﬁne the behavior of peers in a P2P system. These utility
functions take into consideration the costs and beneﬁts as
perceived by each peer by being connected to the P2P sys-
tem and particular events that occur within the P2P system.
Our modeling approach using utility functions allows a bet-
ter understanding of the mechanisms for providing protec-
tion from malicious peers. We also introduce a resource
exploration (Res-Exp) mechanism aimed at mitigating the
vulnerabilities in reputation-based security that are listed
above.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
is a brief overview of related work. Section 3 describes the
general utility model we use for the remainder of the paper.
Section 4 contains the analysis of a P2P system based on the
utility model and introduction of a new security mechanism
for P2P systems. Section 5 contains future work, and ﬁnally
we conclude in Section 6.
2. Related Work
Trust, in the form of reputation management[9, 6, 5, 10],
and incentives[4] have largely been a focus in P2P security
from an end to end perspective. Reputation systems focus
on accumulating reputations and propagating them through
the network, so other peers can interpret the reputations to
make decisions on who they should trust. Incentive solu-
tions provide some form of payment to peers to encourage
good behavior. The problem with reputation systems is that
they require prior knowledge to work. In other words, peers
are vulnerable to attack if they do not have knowledge or
correct knowledge of other peers in a reputation system. As
stated in the introduction, the vulnerability is most evident
when a peer ﬁrst enters a system or a peer previously recog-nized as benign chooses to betray trust (or is compromised).
Since that peer would have a good reputation up until that
point, a reputation system would give no reason not to trust
that peer. Incentive systems are vulnerable because they do
not prevent attack, they just give more reason to cooperate
in the system, but the vulnerability is still there if the mali-
cious peer prefers acting maliciously enough.
Research in economics, particularly utility functions and
game theory, has had a large inﬂuence in computer science.
While much of the research is focused on auctions, some
similar concepts that are discussed in this paper are being
researched [7]. In particular, economic-based approaches
have permeated both security [4, 8] and P2P computing
[1, 3, 4]. These solutions do very little to address general
malicious behavior in P2P systems. Instead, those related
to P2P systems are largely focused on incentives to prevent
freeloading.
In the remainder of this paper, we borrow techniques
from utility and game theory in order to model and analyze
peers in a P2P system.
3. Utility Model
We deﬁne a set of relationships between beneﬁts and
costs that are intended to capture the potential sources of
beneﬁt and cost that would drive a generic peer. By generic,
we mean that we do not require a peer to be purely ma-
licious or purely benign. Instead, a peer’s actions will be
evaluated based on its utility function. The following terms
are used in the relationships.
The utility function is normalized to unit-less (typically
non-negative) values. Since most of the low-level compo-
nents that make up the utility relationships are preferences,
such as an aversion to being subjected to a denial of service
attack, we do not provide any formal method for determin-
ing the values of those costs and beneﬁts, though in many
casesthesebeneﬁtsandcostscouldbedescribedﬁnancially.
The V ictimCost is a relation that captures the negative
effect on a peer when it becomes the victim of an attack. It
allows us to describe a peer’s aversion to being attacked and
plays a large role in determining how much effort should go
into avoiding attacks or whether to participate in a system
at all.
V ictimCost = SpyV ictim + DenyV ictim
+MisinformV ictim
(1)
Benign beneﬁt captures the beneﬁt gained by legitimate
participation in a P2P system. It consists of the beneﬁt a
peer perceives from accessing resources and any beneﬁt that
is derived from mechanisms in the system (for example, in-
centives for sharing useful resources).
BenignBenefit = AccessToResourceBenefit
+MechanismBenefit
(2)
Malicious beneﬁt captures the beneﬁt gained from act-
ing maliciously. This is described by the actions of spying
on a peer, denying access to a peer, and providing faulty
information to a peer.
MaliciousBenefit = Spy + Deny + Misinform (3)
Benign cost is the cost of participating in the system.
This is the overhead cost of staying in the system (as de-
rived and normalized from energy, memory, bandwidth,
etc.) in addition to the costs incurred from providing re-
sources and any costs from mechanisms incorporated in the
system (such as punishments to prevent freeloading).
BenignCost = TimeConnected + ProvidingResources
+MechanismCost
(4)
Malicious costs are costs associated with malicious ac-
tions, and include bandwidth costs or processing costs.
While these are likely to be relatively small for a malicious
peer, they do exist and are incorporated into the relation-
ships.
MaliciousCost = Spy + Deny + Misinform (5)
All of these beneﬁts are tied together and then related
to each other to provide the overall utility as described in
Equation 8. Also included in the cost is DiscoveryCost
which is the cost of an attacker being discovered (which
may take the form of having to exit and re-enter the system
or even just a decrease in available peers to attack).
Benefit = BenignBenefit + MaliciousBenefit (6)
Cost = BenignCost + MaliciousCost + V ictimCost
+DiscoveryCost
(7)
Utility = Benefit − Cost (8)
For the remainder of this paper we will simplify
some of the details of speciﬁc attacks by dealing only
with BenignBenefit, MalciousBenefit, BenignCost,
MaliciousCost, DiscoveryCost and V ictimCost. We
feel that handling the relationships at this level of details
provides sufﬁcient information without sacriﬁcing simplic-
ity and generality. Furthermore, this approach allows us tospeak generally about attacks rather than identifying spe-
ciﬁc attacks during the analysis.
For simplicity in our analysis, we examine purely be-
nign versus purely malicious peers, though we could model
hybrid peers which would represent a peer that uses the
system both as it is intended and maliciously. Mali-
cious peers only gain utility from successfully attacking
other peers and can be modeled by using the components
MaliciousBenefit, BenignCost, DiscoveryCost and
MaliciousCost. Purely benign peers only gain utility from
successfultransactionsandcanbemodeledwiththecompo-
nents BenignBenefit, BenignCost, and V ictimCost.
4. Resource Exploration
4.1. Theory
From a utility perspective, security mechanisms can be
introduced in order to manipulate the utility perceived by a
peer without having to change the peer’s preferences. The
goal of such a security mechanism is to reduce (or ideally
eliminate) the effectiveness of an attacker while not being
a signiﬁcant burden on benign peers. A mechanism should
simultaneously require an attacker to change to a strategy
that involves less malicious activity in order to maximize its
utilityandatleastnotdecreasetheutilityofbenignpeers. In
other words, the benign peer should have its expected utility
improved by suffering less V ictimCost, and that reduction
in expected V ictimCost should at least balance the costs
inﬂicted by implementing the mechanism.
We introduce a novel mechanism called resource explo-
ration (Res-Exp) in this section. The main idea of the Res-
Exp mechanism is to send out exploratory requests in ad-
dition to real requests. These exploratory messages are de-
signed to reveal the nature of the peers. Peers will incur a
cost by sending the exploratory messages (ResExpCost),
but the messages reduce the likelihood of being attacked
through increasing the costs incurred by the attacker if dis-
covered as a malicious peer (DiscoveryCost).
At this point, we must state some assumptions about
the Res-Exp approach. First, we have to assume that the
peer responding to the request cannot differentiate between
exploratory and regular requests. We justify this assump-
tion by noting that a peer can reuse previously obtained
results, self-generated results, or pre-programmed results
depending on the speciﬁc application. Second, we have
to assume that the peer sending the Res-Exp requests can
verify whether or not an attack has occurred. We justify
this assumption by noting that the assumption is common,
though often not explicitly stated, in P2P reputation re-
search [2, 5, 12] since in order to provide opinions, peers
must know that they were attacked. In many cases, this is
manually determined by human users, but due to the cost of
human intervention, our work is most useful if the attacks
can be automatically determined (for instance, comparing
the known checksum of a ﬁle to a generated checksum of
the ﬁle sent by another peer).
Before a peer can decide to utilize the above Res-Exp
mechanism, it needs to determine at what rate to send out
exploratory messages. We will show two similar methods
for determining this rate. The ﬁrst is to show the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium. This approach is difﬁcult since
it requires knowledge of the attacker’s preference. In order
to overcome this limitation, we provide a second approach
that allows a peer to determine bounds that it is willing to
operate within.
4.2. Nash Equilibrium
In order to determine a Nash equilibrium we have to set
up the parameters of the game as shown in Figure 1. The
setup is a two player game comprising of a requesting peer
and a serving peer. The requesting peer can either send an
exploratory message or a request message. The serving peer
can either respond with an attack or with a legitimate re-
sponse. In all cases, each peer will incur BenignCost. For
the sake of simplicity, we will also assume that the cost of
serving maliciously is the same as serving benignly and that
cost of sending an exploratory request is the same as the
cost of sending a legitimate request. This does not have to
be true for this approach to work though, it just requires us
to work at a lower level and with more terms in the utility
relationships. Giventhis, wecanreducetheeffects(notcap-
tured in BenignCost) of an action down to the cost of be-
ing discovered when the serving peer attacks an exploratory
message, the beneﬁt from acting malicious and the cost of
being a victim when a serving peer attacks a legitimate re-
quest, and the beneﬁt a peer receives from being served dur-
ing a legitimate request. By setting the expected value of
each action a peer could take equal to the alternative ac-
tion, we can determine the mixed-strategy equilibrium. As
a result, the serving peer should attack with a probability
deﬁned by Equation 10 and the requesting peer should use
exploratory messages with a probability deﬁned by Equa-
tion 9.
Pexp =
MaliciousBenefit
DiscoveryCost + MaliciousBenefit
(9)
Pattack =
BenignBenefit
V ictimCost + BenignBenefit
(10)
An obvious downside to this approach is that it requires
a knowledge of the opponent’s preferences. It also does
not assure that the transaction is beneﬁcial (not playing the
game could result in a higher expected utility than play-
ing). For instance, if there is no DiscoveryCost, then PexpFigure 1. Payoff Matrix for a Benign Peer and a Malicious Peer
equals one, which will never result in a resource access. In
order to overcome these two shortcomings, we also look at
the Res-Exp mechanism from the perspective of selecting
a rate based on maximizing our own utility and producing
a preference bound on what attackers will beneﬁt from at-
tacking.
4.3. Utility Driven
The utility of a benign peer and that of a malicious peer
are modeled by Equations 11 and 12 respectively where
Pexp is the probability of sending an exploratory message.
Utilitybenign = Access −
BenignCost
1 − Pexp
− (1 − Pexp)
×V ictimCost
(11)
Utilityattacker = (1 − Pexp) × MaliciousBenefit
−
MaliciousCost
1 − Pexp
− BenignCost
(12)
Input: Peer Preferences
Output: Resource Access Results
while Resource Not Accessed do
Calculate Pexp;
Generate Request (Pexp are exploratory);
Send Request;
if Request Is Exploratory then
if Attacked then
Blacklist Attacker;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Sending Exploratory Re-
quests
Algorithm 1 utilized the relationships listed above in
order to implement a Res-Exp mechanism. By exam-
ining these relationships we can show the effects of ex-
ploratory messages as in Figure 2. Maximum V ictimCost
is the plot that shows what a peer’s maximum victim cost
can be to still expect positive utility from an interaction
with a given exploratory message rate. Maximum At-
tacker MaliciousBenefit is the plot that shows the max-
imum MaliciousBenefit that the given exploratory mes-
sage rate would return a negative expected value if an at-
tacker was to act maliciously.
We produce an example application of this mechanism
in Figure 2. As we cannot generically speak for all peers
that may possibly enter a system, we make some reasonableFigure 2. Effect of Exploration Message on a Benign and an Attacking Peer
assumptions in order to provide this example. The ﬁgure
is produced assuming simple values of BenignCost and
MaliciousCost as 1 and a BenignBenefit of 10 in order
to provide an example. In other words, the cost of partic-
ipating in the system is the same for both the attacker and
the benign peer (for example, the each peer consumes one
unit of energy). The beneﬁt that a benign peer receives from
a successful resource access is 10 times the cost of partici-
pation (for example, accessing the resource remotely saves
the benign peer 10 units of energy).
In the case of this example, the benign peer will maxi-
mize its own expected value, given no knowledge about its
potential attackers by exploring at a rate of Pexp equal to
82%. Similarly, the relationships show that a rational at-
tacker would not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to attack the peer if its
MaliciousBenefit for the attack was less than 40. While
not all sets of preferences will produce the same results,
the form of the graph will be similar and still provide a set
of bounds and guidelines for a peer to use to determine at
what rate to send exploratory messages, and what protec-
tive bounds exist. A benign peer playing the utility-based
strategy at its highest point is guaranteed the minimum vul-
nerability to attacks while still acheiving positive utility.
Since a malicious peer will be discovered by an ex-
ploratory message, if it is not aware that the peer it is attack-
ing is utilizing the Res-Exp mechanism, it will reveal itself
on the ﬁrst exploratory request, thus mitigating attacks on
peers recently entering the system and allowing such peers
to use the system conﬁdently than when using a reputation
mechanism. Furthermore, the peer will continue to use the
Res-Exp mechanism, so any one-time or compromised peer
attacks will also be mitigated because of the high likelihood
of being discovered. If the malicious peer knows that the
Res-Exp mechanism is being used, then it will have to prob-
abilistically increase its benign service in order to not be
discovered, which increases resource availability in the sys-
tem and beneﬁting all benign peers.
Online route ﬁnding would be an example application
where the Res-Exp mechanism would apply well. For in-
stance, Alice is visiting a new campus and wants to ﬁnd the
the room where she is supposed to be giving a presentation
from her current location, the University Center. She uses
her PDA to contact a route service in the University Cen-
ter, but is uncertain if the service is reliable (or even if it
is malicious). She has several known routes on campus al-
ready stored in her PDA, so her PDA employees a resources
exploration mechanism in order to test the reliability of the
service and reduce her risk of receiving bad results. In this
case, the cost of making several requests is minimal relative
to the cost of being attacked (going to the wrong building
or room and missing her presentation), which is the type of
application in which Res-Exp is most appropriate.
5. Future Work and Conclusions
There are many exciting areas of future works that can
stem from this project. As mentioned earlier, the work with
Nash equilibria is only useful if we know the preferences
of the opponent. In auctions and multi-agent systems, there
is already work being done in preference elicitation [11],but similar work could be expanded in P2P systems to ﬁnd
Nash equilibria for security. In particular we have already
begun work in this area. We have designed an architecture
that implements the Res-Exp mechanism in a P2P system.
In this architecture, we begin by sending exploratory mes-
sage at the rate that will minimize attacks, but still leave the
peer with positive utility or potentially least loss of utility.
Our further work in this area will involve approximating the
Nash equilibrium described in Section 4.2. In particular, we
will be analyzing techniques for learning the Nash equilib-
rium and showing the resulting performance against many
different types of attackers.
Using utility functions and game theoretical approaches
discussed in this paper, we can analyze the security mecha-
nisms in existing systems to discover exploits in these sys-
tems and to design new mechanisms to prevent those ex-
ploits. In particular, we have begun to develop a frame-
work for quantitatively analyzing and comparing reputation
mechanisms through our proposed utility relationships.
We also have begun analyzing the use of individual
mechanisms, such as resource exploration, in combination
with cooperative mechanisms such as reputation mecha-
nisms. This research will provide insight into the appro-
priate methods for integrating the two approaches and pro-
viding even greater security beneﬁts in P2P systems.
In this paper we have introduced a utility model for eval-
uating security in P2P systems. We have also introduced a
security mechanism, Res-Exp, for individuals in untrusted
environments and analyzed its usefulness based on peers’
utility functions. Res-Exp is a mechanism that can be im-
plemented individually without the cooperation of other
peers in a system. As a result, it mitigates the problems
inherent and often unaddressed by reputation mechanisms.
The proposed unique approach to P2P security is applica-
ble to mobile systems where peers roam into uncertain and
unfamiliar environments. It is particularly suited to appli-
cations in which the cost of making exploratory requests
is signiﬁcantly less than that of being attacked. Res-Exp
mechanism can provide beneﬁt to peers and mitigate vul-
nerabilities in reputation mechanisms.
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